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Why Context Matters: Overconfidence, 
Narcissism, and the Role of Objective 
Uncertainty in Entrepreneurship
In s p ire d  by  o u r ow n e x p e r ie n c e s  a n d  
o b s e rv a t io n s —a n d  w ith  m u ch  g ra ti tu d e  for th e  
d eep  insigh ts, gu idance , an d  ch a llen g es of our 
review  team —we w rote "The Right People in the 
W rong P laces: The P aradox  of E n trepreneuria l 
Entry an d  Successful O pportunity  R ealization" 
(Navis & Ozbek, 2016), w ith the aim  of spurring  
d eb a te  an d  new  q uestions a round  the contingent 
in fluences of overconfidence a n d  n arc iss ism  in 
en trep reneursh ip . C en tra l to our artic le  is the 
core—an d  p e rh ap s  provocative—th esis  tha t en ­
trep ren eu rs  a re  regu larly  a ttrac ted  to (repelled 
from) the very types of ven tu re contexts w here 
they a re  leas t (most) likely to be  successful. In this 
spirit, w e found A hsan 's  (2017) en g ag em en t w ith 
our artic le  p recisely  the kind of outcom e w e h ad  
hoped  for. We a re  d eligh ted  to h av e  the opportu­
nity to respond  to h is dialogue!
In h is d ia lo g u e  A hsan  desc rib es  th ree  m ain  
is su es  w ith our artic le  th a t he  a rg u es  lim it its 
po ten tial. First, he  considers our definition of 
venture context to be  too "narrow" an d  oversim pli­
fied. Second, he  finds our conceptualization of
overconfidence "not clear." Third, he  b e lieves our 
conceptualization of narcissism  is "am biguous." 
The result of these purported  issues, A hsan  claim s, 
is tha t our m odel h as  lim ited explanatory  power, 
creates em pirical cha llenges in its testing, u nder­
specifies the en trepreneurial process, an d  im ­
pinges on further theoretical developm ent. G iven 
such serious critiques, one m ight question why our 
p ap e r w as ever even published. O ur explanation, 
in short, is th a t w e believe A hsan 's critiques a re  
m isguided. In the rem ainder of th is response, we 
ad d ress  each  of these  critiques in turn. O ur aim  is 
not only to provide g reater clarity around  the facets 
of our theory th a t m ay be less evident but also—in 
the process—to provide add itional gu idance for its 
continued developm ent an d  em pirical application.
VENTURE CONTEXT
W hen defin ing  ven tu re context in our article, 
w e d is tin g u ish  the se ttin g s in w hich ven tu re op­
portun ities a re  perceived  a n d  p u rsu ed  b a se d  on 
the level of uncerta in ty  their founders m ust bear. 
A hsan  critiques th is definition a s  b e in g  narrow , 
concep tually  unclear, oversim plified, an d  u n ab le  
to account for env ironm enta l fluidity. As we ex­
p la in  below , w e be lieve  th is critique is off-base. 
O ur definition exh ib its co n sid erab le  b read th , is 
concep tually  clear, and , im portantly , supports a  
w ide a rray  of re search  se ttin g s—both s tab le  an d  
ever changing .
To begin, we are  puzzled by A hsan's choice to 
label our definition of venture context a s  "narrow." 
In writing the m anuscript, we conceptualized ven­
ture context in a  w ay that would lend itself well to 
a  variety of related—yet theoretically consistent— 
em pirical specifications. Indeed, scholars can  test 
our theory in relation to various types of ventures 
(e.g., "main street," high tech), industries (e.g., fast 
food, nanotechnology), and/or other classifications. 
W hat allow s for this generality and, in turn, m akes 
these diverse em pirical tests com m ensurate with 
one another is a  m easure that is anchored on the 
level of uncertainty founders in a  given setting must 
bear—regard less of the nature of that setting. Thus, 
rather than  focusing our conceptualization on p a r­
ticular industry stages, for instance, a s  A hsan would 
have us do—and  which m ay not alw ays exhibit by 
the sam e level of uncertainty—we defined venture 
context according to the core, essen tial logic of our 
theory: the level of environm ental uncertainty p res­
ent. Doing so not only results in a  definition that is
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sufficiently broad and  general but also  reflects the 
type of theoretical precision and  em pirical flexibility 
that exemplifies high-quality, useful theory.
A hsan  a lso  ex p resses  concerns abou t the c la r­
ity of our trea tm en t of uncertain ty , question ing  
w hether w e consider it in  an  objective or p e rcep ­
tu a l (subjective) sen se  in our definition. Here, 
w hile A hsan  correctly ex p la in s  th a t th is d istinc­
tion h a s  critica l theore tical im portance (e.g., Boyd, 
D ess, & R asheed , 1993), w e believe he is m is­
g u id ed  in a sse rtin g  th a t it is not ev iden t in our 
ow n work. In particu la r, to m ake c lea r our in terest 
in objective u ncerta in ty  in the article, w e specify 
th a t the uncerta in ty  w ith w hich w e a re  concerned 
is "endem ic" to ven tu re  contexts an d  is, thus, 
som eth ing  th a t en trep ren eu rs  m ust "bear." We 
a re  not only c lea r tha t our em p h asis  is not on 
percep tion  but w e a lso  never portray, or beg in  to 
a llu d e  to, the notion of uncerta in ty  in its p ercep ­
tu a l form w hen e lu c id a tin g  our m odel. These 
po in ts  no tw ithstand ing , how ever, we acknow l­
ed g e  th a t g rea te r clarity  a round  th is point m ay 
h av e  b een  w arran ted  in the article. H ad we jux­
tap o sed  th ese  two forms of uncerta in ty  in more 
explicit term s, it m ay h av e  p recluded  sev e ra l of 
A hsan 's  o ther concerns, w hich, a s  w e describe  
later, a p p e a r  to resu lt from ev a lu a tin g  the artic le  
th rough  the  lens of p e rcep tu a l uncertain ty .
The final point A hsan m akes about our definition 
of venture context is to critique it a s  oversimplified 
an d  unable to account for environm ental fluidity. 
As we d iagnosed A hsan 's rationale for this a rgu­
ment, w hat becam e clear to us w as a  difference in 
our desired  aim  for the article and, more generally, 
in our approach tow ard theory developm ent. W hen 
describing our definition of venture context a s  over­
simplified, for instance, A hsan explains that
not all new technologies are the sam e and  vary in 
terms of complexity and gestation period (e.g., apps, 
biotechnology, m edical devices). This m eans that 
in some cases a  venture context might be novel for 
a  few months, w hereas in other situations a  venture 
context might rem ain novel for more than a  decade 
(2017: 145- 146).
A hsan  im plies th a t th ese  d iverse  conditions re ­
flect com plexities th a t n eed  to be m ore explicitly 
m odeled  for our theory  to b e  useful. O n th is point 
w e could not d isag re e  more. W hile A hsan  cor­
rectly  recognizes th ese  very re a l n u an ces  th a t can  
occur in practice, w e do not believe our artic le  w as 
the  ap p ro p ria te  p lace  to e lu c id a te  them .
We subm it th a t theo re tical m odels like our own, 
w hich a re  focused on "big idea" concepts ra th e r
th an  m ore increm ental ex tensions of ex isting  
m odels (Kilduff, 2006), should  not attem pt to "boil 
the ocean" an d  specify the  various an d  in tricate  
p a th w ay s of their app lica tion . Not only does such  
ad d e d  com plexity lead  scho lars  to lose the forest 
for the trees, in term s of the m ost essen tia l, in ­
teresting , an d  usefu l e lem en ts of the  theory, but 
it a lso  im poses cognitive rig id ities th a t m ay  in ­
d ica te  th a t sa id  theory is m ore narrow  an d  sp e ­
cific th an  it is in reality . A b e tte r app roach , we 
contend, is to be  excep tionally  c lea r abou t the 
core theore tical m echan ism s a t p lay  in the m odel. 
In our c a se  th ese  m echan ism s ex p la in  the  core 
l in k a g e s  am o n g  e n v iro n m e n ta l  u n c e r ta in ty , 
overconfidence, narcissism , an d  their effects at 
d ifferent levels. Thus, our m odel p rovides c lea r 
theoretical gu idance , but it leav es its app lica tion  
to a sso c ia ted  re search  questions an d  se ttings to 
the d iscre tion  of scho lars in te rested  in tes tin g  an d  
ex tend ing  its core tenets. Illu stra ting  th is point in 
term s of A hsan 's  conjecture, then, to the ex ten t 
tha t the gesta tion  of a  technology red u ces en v i­
ronm enta l uncertain ty , w e m ake it c lea r in our 
theory tha t th is m atu red  technology environm ent 
should  no longer be  considered  novel from an  
em pirica l testin g  standpo in t. In short, w e explic­
itly d es ig n ed  our theory to support th ese  com plex 
em pirica l re a litie s—an d  it does so w ith consid ­
e rab le  flexibility an d  sim plicity.
Sim ilar id eas  app ly  to A hsan 's critique that we 
"largely ignore the influence of the prim ary factors 
tha t create  opportunities—nam ely, technological 
innovation an d  environm ental ch an g es—on the 
perception, pursuit, an d  realization of opportuni­
ties" (2017:146). Here aga in , w e em phasize tha t our 
m odel is agnostic abou t these  an teced en t deta ils  
by design. Our focus in stead  is sim ply on the level 
of uncertain ty  p resen t in the environm ents w here 
venture opportunities a re  being  perceived  and  
pu rsued—reg ard less  of the possib le  factors that 
m ay have led to such uncertainty. The ra tiona le  for 
this app roach  re la tes  back to our focus on objective 
uncertainty, w here the factors that c reate  oppor­
tunities a re  unlikely to have  any  system atic b ea r­
ing on the m ain  re la tionsh ips in our model. Thus, 
given their irre levance to the core m echan ism s w e 
theorize, it w as app ropria te  for us to exclude them  
from our model.
OVERCONFIDENCE
We next turn  to A hsan 's concern w ith our con­
ceptualization of overconfidence, w hich he  reports
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lacks clarity  an d  poses em pirical challenges. 
A hsan  sp ecu la tes  that "w hat m ight seem  like 
o v e rco n fid en c e  m ig h t a c tu a l ly  b e  th e  self- 
confidence of the entrepreneur, an d  this cognitive 
b e lie f  (se lf-con fidence) co u ld  v a ry  from  one 
ven tu re to the next" (2017: 146), an d  th a t "w hether 
som eth ing  is self-confidence or overconfidence 
cannot be determ ined  until the  outcom e of the 
action  is known" (2017: 146). We respond  to these  
points in th ree w ays. First, we take the opportu­
nity to clarify our focus on overconfidence a n d  not 
self-confidence (or self-efficacy or optim ism ) in 
the artic le . Second, w e exp la in  the im portance of 
th is clarification  to our theory and , rela ted ly , 
A hsan 's  concern  tha t founders' overconfidence 
m ay vary  from one ven tu re to the next. Third, we 
com m ent on the n a tu re  of the em pirica l ch a llen g e  
A hsan  describes.
To begin, w ha t se p a ra te s  overconfidence from 
self-confidence is the cognitive b ia s  th a t exem ­
plifies the form er construct. W e m ake th is point 
explicit in the artic le , ex p la in in g  tha t
b ec au se  overconfidence im plies a  cognitive b ia s  
th a t influences decision  m ak ing  (Trevelyan, 2008), 
it differs from re la ted  concepts like self-efficacy 
an d  optim ism , w hich refer, respectively , to in ­
d iv id u a ls ' confidence in  the ir ab ility  to perform  
a  ro le  or ta sk  (Boyd & Vozikis, 1994; C a s s a r  & 
F rie d m a n , 2009; C h en , G re en e , & C rick, 1998) 
a n d  their expectation  of positive outcom es, even 
w h en  no  ra t io n a l  b a s is  for th o se  e x p e c ta tio n s  
ex ists  (Hm ieleski & Baron, 2008, 2009; U cbasaran , 
W esthead , W right, & Flores, 2010)'' (Navis & Ozbek, 
2016: 112).
M oreover, to en su re  th is point is not lost, we m ake 
reference to th is cognitive b ia s  th roughout the 
article. As w ith o ther research , the reaso n  con­
struct c larity  is so critica l in our c a se  is tha t it 
m atte rs  fundam en tally  for the theore tical m ech­
an ism s w e theorize—nam ely, those p erta in in g  to 
the effects of overconfidence in the p resen ce  of 
uncertain ty . W hereas h ig h er levels of objective 
u n c e r ta in ty  c le a r ly  e x a c e rb a te  th e  e ffec ts  of 
o v e rco n fid en c e  (e.g., H ay w ard , S h ep h e rd , & 
G riffin , 2006; M alm en d ie r & T ate , 2008), it is not 
c lea r that the sam e outcom e is true of h igher levels 
of perceived  uncertainty. This ag a in  is why we 
d irec t a tte n tio n  to w ard  o b jec tiv e—ra th e r  th a n  
p erceived—uncerta in ty  in the article.
The ab o v e  logic a lso  sh ed s  ligh t on why 
A h san 's  no tion  of se lf-confidence does not fit 
a s  c lean ly  in our m odel. F irst, it is not c lea r 
w h e th e r a  h ig h e r level of ob jective u n ce rta in ty
ex a c e rb a te s  th e  effects of se lf-confidence the 
sam e  w ay  it does for overconfidence. Second, 
w h e rea s  se lf-confidence (and  p e rce iv ed  u n ­
certain ty ) m ay vary  co n sid e rab ly  from v en tu re  to 
v en tu re  a s  a  function of founders ' ex p e rien ce  an d  
fam ilia rity  w ith  a  re sp ec tiv e  v en tu re  con tex t—a s  
A h san  a llu d e s  to in h is d iscu ss io n  of ex p ert en ­
trep ren eu rs , for in s ta n c e —overconfidence is 
le ss  sub ject to th e se  e x p e r ie n tia l  a n d  co n tex ­
tu a l  id io sy n c ra s ie s . Even if it were, how ever, we 
note th a t our m odel w ould still support th is  v a r i­
ability. All tha t m atte rs  for our theory  is the level of 
overconfidence a n d  e n v iro n m e n ta l  u n c e r ta in ty  
p re s e n t—for a  given re search  sam p le—in s h a p ­
ing founders' p e rc e p tio n s  a n d  p u rs u its  of e n ­
tre p re n e u r ia l  o p p o rtu n itie s . Thus, w h a t A h san  
ra is e d  in  our ap p ro ach  a s  a  flaw, a s  we now  ex­
p lain , m ay be tte r be  understood  a s  a n  im portant 
m easu rem en t consideration  to accoun t for w hen 
tes tin g  our theory.
Building on the above point, an d  no tw ithstand­
ing our case  for construct clarity, w e acknow ledge 
that A hsan  ra ise s  a  valid  point about the cha l­
lenges of m easu ring  overconfidence and, for that 
m atter, d istingu ish ing  it from self-confidence. We 
a re  careful to m ake the former point in the article, 
exp lain ing  tha t "other scho lars have resisted  u s ­
ing the term  'overconfidence,' since its d iagnosis  
requires know ledge of the true p robab ilities a s so ­
ciated  w ith a lternative  decision outcom es, w hich 
m ay be im possible to know in organizational se t­
tings (e.g., C hatterjee & Hambrick, 2011)" (Navis & 
Ozbek, 2016: 110). N onetheless, our choice to focus 
on overconfidence w as d eliberate  an d  driven by 
our in terest in m ain ta in ing  precision in our theo­
retical argum ents. W e note that w hile m easu res  
u sed  to test theory are  rarely  perfect, m eaningful 
proxies can  an d  often do exist. Indeed, the sam e 
is true of overconfidence, w here scholars have 
a sse sse d  th is b ia s  u sin g  such proxies a s  the d u ­
ration of CEO options (M alm endier & Tate, 2005; 
M alm endier, Tate, & Yan, 2011), firm-level in ­
vestm ent behav io rs (Schrand & Zechm an, 2012), 
an d  survey asse ssm en ts  of extrem e confidence 
(Simon & Houghton, 2003; Simon & Shrader, 2012). 
W hat is critical for us, however, is not to build  
theory around  particu lar m easu res but, ra ther, to 
ensure that the constructs an d  m echan ism s sp ec­
ified in our theory a re  a s  pure an d  precise a s  p o s­
sible. Doing so, w e hope, will indeed  open several 
w ays for the artic le to b e  em pirically  tested.
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Finally , A hsan  offers som e in trigu ing  factors 
th a t m ight condition our theorized effects of over- 
confidence. He notes, for instance,
th a t the  en tre p re n eu ria l p rocess in today 's  world 
is very  d ifferent from the ea rly  d ay s of dotcom s. A 
sign ifican t num ber of novel ven tu res  a re  pursued , 
evolved, an d  rea lized  w ith in  incubato rs an d  a c ­
ce lera to rs, a n d  m any novel opportun ities a re  p e r­
ce ived  in  labs, e sp ec ia lly  in  a re a s  such  a s  h ea lth  
sc iences, artific ia l in te lligence, nanotechnology, 
a n d  so forth (2017: 146).
W e ag ree  w ith th ese  notew orthy d ifferences in 
en trep ren eu ria l process, an d  we thank  A hsan  for 
ra is in g  them  a s  p a th s  to further develop  an d  ex­
ten d  our m odel. At the sam e time, how ever, we 
w ould  cau tion  re ad e rs  ag a in s t ado p tin g  an  overly 
ra tio n a lis tic  perspective  in doing so. W ith n a r­
cissism , for instance , w hich w e turn  to next, the 
sam e ch a rism a  th a t e n a b le s  n arc iss is tic  founders 
to se ll their vision to o thers (e.g., E isenm ann, 2013) 
can  su p p re ss  the  quality  of inform ation an d  a c ­
tions they  elicit from "peers, m entors, custom ers, 
an d  investors" (Ahsan, 2017: 146). For th ese  re a ­
sons, an d  m irroring our own experience an d  ob­
serva tions w ith a  w ide a rray  of ven tu re start-ups, 
investors, an d  accelera to rs, A hsan 's notion that 
"en trep ren eu rs who fail to do th is w ill likely be 
w eed ed  out by investors du ring  the opportunity  
realization  p h ase  an d  rep laced  by m ore su itab le  
ind iv iduals"  (2017:146) m ay be m ore the exception 
th an  the rule. However, ra th e r th an  sp ecu la te  
further, w e consider th ese  an d  re la ted  questions 
of how  en trep ren eu ria l p rocess m ight influence 
our theorized re la tio n sh ip s  to be  ripe for em pirical 
investigation!
NARCISSISM
A hsan 's final critiques perta in  to our conceptu­
alization of narcissism , w hich he say s suffers 
from "concept redundancy" w ith overconfidence. 
He a lso  in tro d u ces  w h a t w e w ould  co n sid e r a  
prom ising application and  potential refinem ent of 
our core model, effectively illustrating the m odel's 
utility. We consider each  of these points in turn.
O n the subject of overconfidence an d  narcissism  
b ein g  conflated, w e m ain ta in  tha t the two con­
structs a re  conceptually  distinct. Indeed, one can 
be  overconfident w ithout exhibiting  h igh  levels of 
narcissism . Similarly, one can  exhibit high levels 
of narcissism  w ithout being  overconfident. W hat 
d istingu ishes the two—an d  calls for their sep a ra te  
trea tm ent in the artic le an d  elsew here— are  the
cognitive m echan ism s of the former an d  the b e ­
havioral m echan ism s of the latter. Focusing on 
only one excludes the un ique an d  com plem entary 
in flu en ces of the  other. A lterna tive ly , focusing  
on a  m ore hybrid ized construct like hubris, w hich 
can  m anifest w ith ind iv idua ls  exh ib iting  both 
overconfidence an d  narcissism , c rea tes  em pirical 
cha llenges, s ince both of th ese  d im ensions a re  
not requ ired  a t the sam e level—or even  a t a ll—for 
its d iag n o sis  (Owen & D avidson, 2009). Hence, we 
focused on th ese  two se p a ra te  an d  m ore e s ta b ­
lish ed  constructs to m ore clearly  theorize the in ­
d ep en d en t a n d  com bined effects of each  one. This 
decision  a lso  h a s  im portan t em pirica l im p lica­
tions, a s  w e d escribe  next.
Even though overconfidence an d  narc iss ism  
a re  concep tually  distinct, a s  w e m ain ta in , A hsan  
ra ise s  the  im portan t question  of w he ther the two 
can  be  d is tin g u ish ed  em pirically . We adm ire  h is 
a tten tion  to th ese  im portan t m easu rem en t con­
sidera tions. Here, how ever, w e subm it tha t closer 
a tten tion  to the m easu res  u sed  to a s s e s s  n a rc is ­
sism  helps to reveal th is concern  a s  less  troubling. 
In the c a se  of unobtrusive m easu res  of narc iss ism  
(e.g., C hatterjee  & Hambrick, 2007), for instance , 
the b eh av io ra l ind icato rs u sed  in prior research , 
such  a s  the excessive  u se  of self-absorb ing  la n ­
g u ag e  or com pensa tion  d isc rep an c ies  betw een  
lead e rs  a n d  others, exhib it c lea r d istinctions from 
the cognitive b ia se s  of overconfidence. The sam e 
d istinctions a re  p resen t am ong  m ore direct m ea ­
su res  of narcissism , w here the m ain  factors tha t 
m ake up  the N arcissistic Personality  Inventory 
(e.g., sen se  of authority , exhibitionism , superio r­
ity, vanity, exp lo ita tiveness, entitlem ent, an d  self- 
sufficiency), for instance , a lso  tap  into n arc iss is tic  
q u a litie s  th a t a re  very m uch d istinct from the 
cognitive b ia s  of overconfidence (Raskin & Terry, 
1988). Here we should  m ention th a t w hile it is 
certa in ly  p o ssib le  th a t the p resen ce  of th ese  two 
constructs will, on av e rag e , be h ighly  corre la ted  
in p rac tice—a s  A hsan  su g g es ts  in h is note—we 
a re  carefu l to not p resu p p o se  th is possib ility  in 
our model. Moreover, an d  equa lly  im portant, in 
ca ses  w here th ese  correlations a re  not a s  high, 
ex isting  m easu res  a p p e a r  w ell su ited  to d is tin ­
g u ish  the  in d ep en d en t a n d  v arian t effects of them  
both, a s  w e have  described .
F in a lly , A h sa n  c o n c lu d e s  h is  re p ly  by  
cha lleng ing—a s  "overly sim plistic"—our pro­
p o sa l th a t n arc iss is tic  in d iv idua ls  will be driven 
to pursue novel opportunities. Instead, he argues, 
en trep ren eu rs  a re  m ore likely to en ter dom ains
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at the takeoff stage of an industry's lifecycle 
(Christensen, 1992), since this stage is often typi­
fied by the type of m edia attention and clear and 
unam biguous feedback that narcissistic founders 
crave. In advancing these ideas, Ahsan uses the 
core logic from our theory to develop a  more spe­
cific set of testab le hypotheses. This is exactly the 
outcome we had hoped for from this article. And 
yet it also bears m entioning that had  we narrowed 
our theory in this way ourselves, we would have 
inappropriately limited the scope of its applica­
tion aw ay from other potential dom ains charac­
terized by high levels of uncertainty. In the end, 
we forewent the focus on a  specific application, 
as  Ahsan advocates here, in the interest of de­
veloping theory with broader generality and 
simplicity—a classic trade-off that all scholars 
m ust m ake (Weick, 1979).
CONCLUSION
We wish to close by resurfacing the central 
twist, or paradox, of our article, which easily  gets 
lost in the details of A hsan's dialogue and our own 
response: the expectation that "entrepreneurs 
high in overconfidence and narcissism  are  pro­
pelled toward more novel venture contexts— 
where these qualities are most detrim ental to 
venture success—and are repelled from more 
fam iliar venture contexts—where these qualities 
are  least harmful and may even facilitate ven­
ture success" (Navis & Ozbek, 2016: 109). In other 
words, we call back to the more fundam ental 
idea that the "right people" often end up in the 
"wrong places" when it comes to en trepreneurial 
entry and  successful opportunity realization. We 
hope this response provides the clarification, 
guidance, and  fodder to inspire others—like 
A hsan—to advance research  around this idea as 
well!
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